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s military lawyers are well aware, the international legal framework for the
protection and assistance of civilians in conflict situations is well developed
and deeply integrated into the ways lawyers and laypeopJe think and talk about
war. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the cornerstone of international hwnanitarian law (IHL), have now achieved universal adhesion;l over seventy nations
have formed national commissions on IHl;2 and lHL is being studied and written
about in universities, military academies and other forums around the world. In
contrast, the law of international disaster response, referred to in recent years as
"International Disaster Res ponse Laws, Rules and Principles" or "IDRL," has been
described as "neglected'" and "far from complete,"· with no centralized regime
equivalent to the Geneva Conventions, few academic resources dedicated to the issue and, until recently, little attention from the international disaster relief
com m unity.
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The Law of International Disaster Response
Yet, over the last thirty-five years, there have been over fourteen thousand nonconflict disasters worldwide, resulting in more than 2.3 million deaths and affecting an astonishing 5.8 billion persons. s In the overwhelming majority ofthcse disasters, the governments, civil society and communities of the affected States have
borne the brunt of relief and recovery themselves. However, international response
activities have also necessarily been frequent6 and are increasing in proportion to
the growing number and severity of disasters in recent years? Moreover, international disaster operations can sometimes be just as legally challenging as conflict
relief, commonly involving barriers to the entry and effective use of relicfpersonnel, goods, equipment and transport vehicles, as well as regulatory dilemmas for affected States-particularly in light of the growing number and diversity of
international disaster responders.
For their part, military actors have long been engaged in disaster relief,s but their
involvement at the international level also appears to be on the rise. This increased
engagement has led to a greater concern among military lawyers about the legal
pitfalls involved,9 as well as concerns in the humanitarian community about the
consequences of the "militarization" of international disaster assistance.
This paper will sketch the history and broad outlines of the current internationallegal fram ework for transborder disaster relief and recoverylO and discuss
some of the most common legal problems that arise in international operations. It
will then look-from a civilian's perspective-at some of the ramifications for military actors. It will conclude with some thoughts on where the international community might choose to go from here.

Historical Background
While there are early precedents for international reliefin peacetime, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that momentwn slowly began to build toward international systems to address national calamities.!1 For example, in 185 1, France
convened the first of a series of international sanitary conferences to negotiate
agreements to combat the cross-border spread of diseases. 12 In 1869, a resolution
of the second International Conference of the Red Cross affirmed the role of national Red Cross societies in providing relief "in case of public calamity which, like
war, demands immediate and organized assistance."13 In the latc nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, multilateral telegraph and telecommunications treaties
were adopted with specific provisions about emergency communications,14 and
maritime agreements were reached codifying customary norms o n rescue and assistance to vessels in distress. IS
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It was under the auspices of the League of Nations that the first serious attempt
was made to create a comprehensive approach to international disaster relief. In
1927, a conference offorty-three States adopted the Convention and Statutes Establishing an International Relief Union (IRU).16 The Convention stipulated that
the lRU should serve as a centralized operational agency, funneling international
funds and support in disaster settings, coordinating other actors and promoting
study and research on disaster managementY Jt entered into force in 1932 and
eventually attracted thirty member States. However, it was never able to effectively
carry out its mission, due mainly to the crippling lack of funds incident to its inability to command regular contributions from member States.18 Jt intervened in
two disasters and sponsored several scientific studies, but by the late 1930s, the IRU
had already effectively ceased to function, though it was not officially terminated
until 1967.19
After the failure of the IRU, international law on disaster relief developed in a
fragmented and mostly unplanned manner, and institutional mandates were
shared among a number of actors. In the 1950s, several States, notably the United
States, began concluding bilateral treaties regulating the delivery of relief goods.20
A second and third wave of bilateral treaties, mainly concerned with mutual
assistance, were agreed upon in the 1970s and the 1990s respectively, mainly in
EurOpe.21 Moreover, a number of multilateral treaties in other sectors of the law
(such as customs harmonization,n marine and air transport ll and environmental
protection2~) began to include provisions relevant to international disaster response, and recent decades have seen an upsurge in disaster-focused instruments
(both "hard" and "soft"), particularly at the regional level.
A second attempt to develop a comprehensive treaty on disaster relief was made
in 1984, when the United Nations Disaster Response Office (UNDRO), the forerunner to the Office for the Coordination ofHwnanitarian Affairs (OCHA), developed a "Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance"
and presented it tothe Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).2s The Draft Convention sought to set out basic rules for the entry and operation of international disaster relief from States and humanitarian organizations, including with regard to
visas, customs clearance, transport rules, communications and liability. ECOSOC
referred the text to the UN's Second Committee,26 which, despite expressions of
support from several States,27 took no official action on it, and the convention was
never adopted.
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The Current International Legal Framework
As a result of the forego ing, the current international legal and institutional framework for lORl is dispersed, with gaps of scope, geographic coverage and precision.
Still, there are a nwnber of instruments that are worth highlighting-both for their
potential uses and for their weaknesses.
Global Treaties
One of the most successful disaster law instruments in terms of ratification is the
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency of 1986 (hereinafter Nuclear Accident Convention). 28 Adopted in the immediate wake of the Chernobyl accident, the Nuclear Accident Convention has
garnered ninety-six State parties. 29 It lays out basic rules for the initiation, coordination and operation of international assistance operations in case of nuclear or radiological events, touching on the transit of equipment and personnel, privileges
and immunities, and costs. However, as its name indicates, it is relevant only to nuclear and radiological emergencies-among the least frequent of the various types
of major disasters.30 Moreover, by its terms, it applies only to States, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lA£A) and other "inter-governmental organizations," despite the essential role that the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-State actors have played in the
recovery from the Chernobyl disaster. 3 !
In contrast, the two global customs treaties with specific provisions on disaster
response both apply to "relief consignments" regardless of their source. They are
thus relevant to the full range of international relief actors. Specifically, Annexes
8.3 and J.5 of the Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs
Procedures (<< Kyoto Convention") as amended in 199932 call on States to exempt
"relief consignments" from many normal customs processes, duties and restrictions. Similarly, Annex 8.9 of the Convention on Temporary Admission ("Istanbul
Convention" ) of 199013 provides for exemptions from customs duties for certain
types of equipment intended for re-export after a disaster relief operation. However, their membership is quite small,34 and, in particular, includes only a handful
of the most disaster-prone States. 3S
Another recent convention that applies to the full range of international disaster responders is the Tampere Convention on the Provision ofTelecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations of 1998.39 The
Tampere Convention calls for the elimination or reduction of regulatory barriers
to the importation and operation oftelecommunications equipment and personnel for disaster response purposes. It is the only instrument of its kind that extends
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privileges and immunities, equivalent to those granted to the United Nations, to
NGO personnel (though only those directly connected to relieftelecommunications).40
The Tampere Convention entered into force on January 8, 2005, and its first test
came in Sri Lanka (which had ratified it in 1999) with regard to the response to the
December 26, 2004 tsunami. Unfortunately, it appears that its provisions were invoked neither by the government nor by international relief providers, although
some of them encountered problems with regard to the import and use of telecommunications equipment. 4 1 On the other hand, some practitioners have reported
success in referring to the treaty, even with regard to operations in States not party
to it, as evidence of an international consensus on the need to facilitate the use of
telecommunications in relief.42Still, like the customs conventions, membership in
the Tampere Convention remains limited 43 and currently includes only four of the
twenty-five most disaster-prone States. 44
In 2000, the International Civil Defence Organization drafted a Framework
Convention on Civil Defence Assistance}6 to improve mutual assistance between
civil defense organizations in international disaster response operations. The
Framework Convention sets out mechanisms for the offer and acceptance of assistance, regulations for how such assistance should be carried out, provisions for the
reduction of administrative and customs barriers and "necessary" privileges and
immunities for responders, and commitments to facilitate transit of civil defense
units. It also calls on parties to supplement its provisions with more detailed agreements to carry out its spiritY Though it has twenty-six signatories, to date only
thirteen States have ratified or acceded to it, including no Western States. 38
A further iORL convention with limited membership (twenty-two parties, including twenty-one States and the European Community'S) is the Food Aid Convention.46 Originally adopted in 1967, it has gone through several revisions, the
most recent of which was in 1999. It sets out annual quotas of certain types offood
aid 47 to be provided by each member (whether bilaterally or through NGOs or
"multilateral channels" ) to certain recipient States, covering both emergency and
non-emergency situations. It also sets out a number of guidelines as to the type and
manner in which food aid should be delivered, including adherence to "basic humanitarian principles," international quality standards and local dietary habits,
and attention to the particular needs of women and children and other vulnerable
groups, as well as potential harmful effects on local hanrests and markets.
Critics have charged that the Food Aid Convention fails to effectively stabilize
food aid because quotas have been set very low (substantially below the total
amount of food aid given by most members) and have been repeatedly renegotiated downward in periods of tight supplies and that little effort is made to monitor
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the quality requirements. 48 The convention is currently set to expire on June 30,
2007, if it is not extended or renegotiated. 49
Limited membership is unlikely to be a problem for the revised International
H ealth Regulations (IHR) adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2005 and
scheduled to enter into force in 2007,50 inasmuch as the constitution of the assembly provides that all instruments adopted by that body will be binding on all member States unless they explicitly "opt OU1."51 The revised IHR were prompted by
communications failures in the SARS outbreak of2003 and has been described as a
radical development in international health law. 52 It expands the scope of its predecessor instrument (which only applied to three types of disease) by obligating State
parties to report on all diseases that might constitute a transborder public health
threat and by greatly expanding the authority of the World H ealth Organization
(WHO ) to act upon information of outbreaks. Significantly, this includes for malizing WHO's authority to receive and act upon reports originating from nongovernmental actors.53 Beyond this preventive aspect, the IHR's provisions requiring national public health restrictions on import of goods to be kept to a reasonable
minimum in line with the potential threat might also be of use in a disaster response setting in which goods and personnel must quickly cross borders.
Regional Law
Each of the major regions has also adopted at least some law on disaster response,
though there is great variation in its scope. As in other areas of international law,
Europe boasts the most elaborate framework of agreements. These include, among
others, the Fourth Lome Convention of 1989,54 which sets out guidelines for assistance by Europe to African, Caribbean and Pacific States; the Council of Europe--Open Partial Agreement (EUR-OPA) Major Hazards Agreement of 1987, which
created a framework of regular high-level meetings to improve cooperation in disaster response and prevention;SS the European Community Civil Protection
Mechanism, first adopted in 200 1, which helps to coordinate the extraterritorial
work of civil protection offices;56 the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents of 1992, one of the most important treaties on man-made disasters;S7 subregional instruments such as the Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on Cooperation across State Frontiers to Prevent or
Limit Damage to Persons or Property or to the Environment in the Case of Accidents of 1989;58 and the Agreement among the Governments of the Participating
States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters of
1998 (hereinafter BSEC Agreement).59

298

David Fisher
In the Americas, the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance was adopted in 1991 60 with a number of provisions designed to lower bureaucratic and other barriers to easy entry of foreign disaster assistance; however, it
was only ratified by three States.61 Greater success was seen with the agreements
creating subregional inter-governmental mechanisms for disaster response, induding the Coordination Centre for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central America (CEPREDENAC),62 the Andean Committee for the Prevention and Response
to Disasters (CAPRADE),63 and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response
Agency (CDERA).64
In Africa, there has been little systematic lawmaking at the regional level on disaster response. 6S One exception is the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),66 originally created with the primary purpose of building
cooperation to address issues of drought and desertification. Moreover, in recent
years, proposals have been discussed to adopt a disaster-specific instrument in the
Southern African Development Community (SADC).67
The most recent regionallDRl treaty was adopted in Asia in the wake of the
2004 tsunami . The Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response of2005 (not yet in force) (hereinafter ASEAN Agreement)68
is remarkable for its broad scope--<overing disaster risk reduction, rellef and recovery and addressing all types of international disaster responders-as well as for
its attention to some of the key problem areas, induding visas, customs, transport
and coordination issues in international operations. It will also create a dedicated
"Asian Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance" with broad responsibilities to share information and assist in coordinating disaster assistance to member States both in the region and from international actors.
Bilateral Treaties and Agreemen ts
The overwhelming bulk of existing internationallDRL instruments are bilateral
agreements between States and between States and international humanitarian organizations. There are well over one hundred bilateral treaties, most of them in Europe.69 In general, they tend to cover issues of initiation of assistance, entry of
personnel and goods, command and control of response teams, assignment of
costs (generally to the receiving State), and guarantees against liability (always in
favor ofthe responding State). Bilateral agreements with humanitarian organizations (mostly with international organizations, such as UN agencies, but also, increasingly, with major international NGOs) tend to set out the parameters of the
organization's long-term activities in the nation as well as any applicable legal
privileges.

299

The Law of International Disaster Response
Soft Law, Guidelines and Models
Beyond the "hard law" described above, there are an important number of relevant
"soft law" instruments, such as resolutions or declarations of international bodies,
as well as guidelines, models and codes developed mainly by experts or by the humanitarian community itself. Some of these, though admirably crafted, have been
mainly forgotten. However, others have formed the basis for systems of international cooperation in disaster response that are certainly as important as any currently based on "hard law."
Among the best-known resolutions are UN General Assembly Resolution 46/
182 of 1991 , which sets out general parameters for UN humanitarian assistance
and the role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
and 57/150 of 2002, which called on States to facilitate the entry and operation of
international urban search and rescue teams in disaster settings and, in turn, called
on those teams to comply with the quality standards set out in guidelines developed and facilitated by an international advisory group. The Hyogo Framework for
Action, adopted by an international conference in 2005 70 and later affirmed by a
resolution of the UN General Assembly, also includes institutional and regional
preparedness for relief among its primary priorities/I but this element has not
been emphasized in the follow-up activities of States and the United Nations.
An important resolution that is less well known today is the Measures to Expedite International Relief, adopted by both the International Conference of the Red
Cross and the UN General Assembly in 1977.12 This resolution discussed in some
detail some of the most practical types oflegal facilities governments should ensure
for international disaster assistance providers. Unfortunately, it has rarely been
evoked in modern operations.
A number of "off-the-shelf' models and guidelines have also been produced
with the intention to speed agreements between affected States and international
actors wishing to provide assistance. For military actors, the Oslo Guidelines on the
Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, as updated in 2006 and
discussed in greater detail below, is the most important example. Further guidance
can be found in the UNITAR Model Rules for Disaster Relief of 1996 and the Max
Planck Institution Draft International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance of
1991.73 However, few of these latter documents are well known by disaster response professionals.
The most important instruments relating to the responsibilities of disaster assistance providers are the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief of
1994 and the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Disaster Response as updated in 2004, both developed by humanitarian
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organizations to serve as minimum standards of behavior and performance in disaster reli ef.7~ Both have been well disseminated, and most established humanitarian organizations have indicated that they use them. However, the absence of any
formal mechanism for monitoring and verification of these claims renders an assessment of their impact difficult.
Institution al Mandates and Privileges
In addition to these disaster-specific instruments, the international community
has provided a number of institutions with formal mandates to engage in humanitarian relief, including in disaster situations. The intricacies of this institutional
structure have been described elsewhere7s and will not be explored here, except to
note that they include both global and regional institutions. At the global level,
these include UN agencies and organs and the Red CrossJRed Crescent Movement
among others. At the regional level, organizations such as ASEAN, the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), IGAD, the European Community Civil Protection Mechanism, CEPREDENAC and CDERA have also been accorded important roles with regard to the coordination of international disaster
response.
To a varying extent, these entities have also been provided specific facilities pertinent to their operations. For example, the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 194676 and the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 194777 provide the basis for the recognition of domestic legal personality of UN entities, as well as important exemptions
to normal rules concerning visas, customs, judicial oversight and other regulatory
systems. Similar privileges and immunities have been accorded to the international
components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement in bilateral agreements
with States.18
Importantly, the NGO sector lacks a formal international legal mandate for its
activities, although its effectiveness and prominence is large and growing, as discussed further below.
Summary
In short, there are a number of international instruments relevant to disaster response but their proliferation has not resulted in a coherent legal system. Likewise,
it has been argued with regard to institutional mandates that "there is no international relief system per se, as the diverse set of actors displays little structural interdependence [and lacks] a common boundary, other than the fact that each
component may on occasion contribute to the relief process." 79 OCHA is currently
leading a process of reform to address structural coordination and cooperation
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problems among UN agencies and their humanitarian partners;80however, the international humanitarian community has yet to pay significant attention to the
harmonization of the legal framework.

Legal Problems in International Disaster Response
The absence of a com prehensive system of international law o n any particular
topic is not necessarily a reason for concern. The question is whether there are
problems of a legal or regulatory nature that have been left unaddressed. Insofar as
international disaster response is concerned, the answer to this question is that
there are indeed a number of such problems that arise consistently in major international operations and constitute a substantial drag on their speed, efficiency and
effectiveness. In significant part, these problems can be attri buted to the absence of
previously established laws, regulations and institutional structures focused on international assistance at the national level. Thus, for example, the Pakistani government has acknowledged that "Pakistan suffered from the lack of a p re-existing
National Disaster Management Authority" and applicable legal structure when the
earthquake struck in October 2005. 81 Likewise, the United States Governmen t Accountability Office issued a report in the wake of Hurricane Katrina concluding
that "FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the proper acceptance and distribution of in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and militaries."82
Typical problems in in ternational response can be roughly divided in to two
main categories: legal obstacles to the en try and operation of international relief;
and failures of monitoring, coordination and regulation of international aid. Problems of both categories usually coincid e in the same disaster operations. This section will provide a few recent examples.
Obstacles to Entry and Operations
The initiation of international disaster assistance can be difficult for political,
rather than legal, reasons, as some governments have been reluctant to request or
accept needed aid for fear of appearing weak o r dependent, to avoid publicity for a
disaster, and/or to demonstrate their disapproval of the offering party.83 Governments are likewise sometimes unwilling to provide basic information about a disaster for similar reasons, leaving potential responders at a loss as to how best to
react.84 O n the other hand, it has also been the case that foreign donors have pressured governments to accept assistance they did not really need. For example, it was
reported that a large number of foreign governments insisted on sending field hospitals and medical personnel to Indonesia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, despite
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pleas from the Indonesian government and the World Health O rganization that
they were not required.8s
Frequently, however, the problem is more technical. While many States have
some provision in their law as to which department (frequently the office of the
prime minister or president) may initiate a request for international disaster assistance, the lack of standardized systems for making the determination that outside
help is needed has led to long delays,l16 and communication about specific needs is
often imperfect. Thus, for example, after Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005,
it was reported that a Swedish government plane loaded with water purification
gear, blankets and telecommunications equipment was kept on a runway for
eleven days awaiting clearance to fly to the United States. 87 By the time pennission
was granted and the plane was able to depart, none of the su pplies it carried were
still needed.
Sometimes, entry visas for international disaster response personnel have been
either delayed or refused by the governments of affected States, even after international assistance has been requested. For example, several States in Central America have refused visas to relief personnel from other parts of Latin America, in part
due to heightened concerns about illegal immigration.sa In most cases, however,
response personnel have been able to enter affected States on tourist or short-term
visas, but p roblems have emerged later in the operation. For instance, in ternational personnel responding to the 2004 tsunami in Thailand and In donesia were
required to frequently exit and re-enter those nations in order to renew short-term
visas. incurring both significant expense and disruption to their operations. 89
Regulations on the passage of relief transport vehicles and customs delays on incoming goods and equipment are other critical barriers in many operations. 90 For
example, one year after the tsunami struck Indonesia, over four hundred containers of relief goods were still awaiting customs clearance in Jakarta and Medan. 9J In
the meantime, m any of the perishable items rotted, medicines expired, and some
items that were needed at the onset of the response operation (such as tents and
surgical equipment) were no longer required. 92 After H urricane Katrina struck the
United States, the British Ministry of Defence sent five hundred thousand "Meals
Ready to Eat" (MREs) by civil aircraft. 9 ) However, after their arrival in Arkansas, it
was determined that they contained meat products prohibited by US health regulations, and they were therefore stored in a warehouse at significant expense for a
n umber of months pending distribution to other countries. 94
Delays can also arise before goods even reach the borders of the affected nation.
For example, in August 2006, after strong winds in Swaziland left thirteen thousand
persons homeless and exposed to ongoing heavy rains. the IFRC's regional delegation in H arare. Zimbabwe sent a shipment of tarpaulins and tents. 95 However, the
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shipment was delayed at the border with South Africa for five days before they
could proceed to the destination nation, due to problems with customs. Analogously, overflight of transit States can occasionally raise difficulties, as when Pakistan reportedly refused to allow flights of Indian aid to Afghanistan to cross its
airspace. 96
Sometimes customs delays cause headaches over and above the obvious issue of
forestalling the intended use of the affected goods and equipment. For instance, after the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, it was reported that relief goods delayed in customs beyond the statutory storage deadline had been summarily nationalizedY
Somewhat analogously, in Indonesia, storage fees for tsunami relief cargo awaiting
customs clearance mounted so high due to delays that they sometimes exceeded
the value of the relief consignments themselves. 98 Charges of this type, as well as
customs duties and other types of taxes, tolls and fees on disaster operations, have
dramatically increased their costs and lowered their effectiveness. In Sri Lanka, for
example, Oxfam was required to pay a £550,000 customs duty in June 2005 to import twenty-five four-wheel vehicles for its tsunami rehabilitation operations.99
Another common issue that some international disaster responders encounter
is obtaining recognition of their domestic legal status in the affected State. In Thailand, forexampie, international NGOs found the local registration process sodifficult to navigate that nearly none were successful in doing SO.loo As a result, some
had difficulty opening bank accounts, obtaining work permits, hiring local staff
and applying for tax exemptions. \01
Similarly, obtaining recognition of the foreign qualifications of medical personnel has frequently proven difficult. In Nepal, for instance, it was reported that
[wJhilst some organisations were aware of the process of obtaining permission from
the Medical Council of Nepal, the process was a lengthy one and not easily adapted to
emergency situations. Other organisations were not aware of the necessary processes,
and in at least one instance a prominent medical NGO was asked to cease activities
altogether for failing to comply with the regulations. 102

Furthermore, fo reign actors lacking d iplomatic or inter-governmental privileges and immunities find themselves exposed to the risk of civil and/or criminal Iiability in unfamiliar legal systems. On the civil side, local employee recruitment
and tennination reportedly provide particularly fertile ground for litigation in disaster response operations as domestic labor laws generally fail to accommodate
the speedy and short-term staffing requirements of international disaster response
operations. 103 Medical malpractice has also been identified as an area of particular
concern. I04 Exposure to criminal in vestigation was raised as an issue by a number
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of disaster responders to the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, and one that substantially
affected their operations. lOS
Problems of Quality and Coordination
Closely related to entry and operation barriers are issues of quality and adequate
coordination of international relief and recovery assistance. In the absence of effective international mechanisms of control, affected State governments have often
struggled to address the flood of external actors responding to those major disasters with the highest media attention. I06
Perhaps the most important quality issue is the arrival of vast quantities of unwanted, unneeded and inappropriate relief goods, which embroil customs offices,
fill airports and warehouses, and block the flow of needed goods. For example, in
each of the largest disaster operations of2oo5 (e.g., the tsunami in Indonesia, Thailand and India; the earthquake in Pakistan; and Hurricane Katrina in the United
States), heaps of used clothing appeared. In tropical Sri Lanka, these included winter coats and hats, dress shoes, pyjama tops (without bottoms) and even "thong
underwear."107 In Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, piles of useless warm-weather clothes
were burned for warmth. lOS As noted by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEe)
report-a major multiagency study of the international response to the 2004 tsunami-"assistance" in the form of used clothes, expired or poorly labeled medicines, inappropriate food (such as canned pork sent to Muslim Indonesia), and
other assorted eccentric items is "not just worthless to the recipients; it has a negative value. It occupies storage and transport space at the very time when this is
needed for real aid. It then requires special handling to dispose of-all an additional burden on a response."I09
In addition to increased shipments of goods, major disasters are attracting
larger numbers ofintemational actors on the ground. The growth in the numbers
ofNGOs becoming involved in disaster response has been particularly impressive.
For example, after the December 2004 tsunami, it was reported that there were two
hundred NGOs working in Aceh.I IOIn India, nearly three hundred NGOs were reported to be working in Nagapattinam District alone. ll l While particularly pronounced after the tsunami, this trend can be seen in other highly televised disasters
as wel1. 112 In addition, more UN agencies, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies,
private companies and unaffiliated individuals are travelling to disaster sites seeking to help. ]])
Among these new actors, many are inexperienced and some act without sufficient understanding of, or regard for, international standards of quality in disaster
response. As noted by the TEe report, "[ tJ here is general agreement that there were
far too many agencies present in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The low entry barrier to
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the system permits the entry of inexperienced and incompetent actors," and while
"[ eJxperienced agencies are not immune from low quality work ... the risks are
higher with inexperienced actors . "I I ~ Thus, for example, an unidentified NGO was
found to have vaccinated children in a village near Banda Aceh, Indonesia after the
tsunami, leaving no records and no way to determine who had been vaccinated and
who had not. llS
Many "traditional" humanitarians in tsunami-affected nations were also
shocked to find themselves working alongside "Scientologist trawna care" workers
who purported to heal tsunami victims by influencing energy waves with their
hands. ll6 To their dismay, and as noted in one media report from India, "[iJn the
eyes of the local public, [Scientology's] operations are indistinguishable from those
of UNICEF and CARE and the Red Cross." ll7 Other purportedly "humanitarian"
organizations were accused of proselytizing in several tsunami-affected nations,
and even conditioning aid on religious conversion. 11 8
Probably the most common complaints in disaster operations revolve around
problems of coordination and sharing of information between the various actors.
The proliferation of international responders has done nothing to improve these
problems. In the tsunami operations, for example, " ]a]chieving adequate representation and consensus among even the larger, mature INGOs and Red Cross
agencies was not easy; but with such a large number of smaller agencies also on the
ground in the first six months, coherent joint planning and implementation was
unlikely."119 Aceh was dubbed an "information black hole" where overfunded humanitarian agencies competed for beneficiaries, overselVing some communities
and ignoring the needs of others.120
International coordination mechanisms remain largely voluntary--even
among UN agencies-and have struggled to prevent irregular coverage of disasteraffected persons.l2l For their part, national institutional frameworks for monitoring and coordination of international relief were overwhelmed in both Indonesia
and Sri Lanka, leading to multiple structural changes over the course of the relief
and recovery operations in both nations.122
However, even with a more modest international intelVention, governments of
the affected States have experienced significant difficulty in the absence of strong
regulatory and institutional mechanisms. For example, after Tropical Storm Stan
caused massive flooding in Guatemala in October 2005, it was widely recognized
that the national disaster management network "CONRED" and its secretariat
were unable to track and coordinate the activities of the several dozen foreign organizations and States that arrived to provide assistance. 123 In contrast, in Fiji, after a
detailed legal and regulatory structure was put in place for international relief, few
coordination problems were noted in recent disaster operations.12~
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Ramifications for Mili tary Actors
How does all of this relate to military actors? First. as noted above. militaries in a
number of nations are becoming increasingly keen on international disaster relief.
both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. As noted by the United Nations. "Member States. even those who do not give a primary role to their military forces in domestic response. are now using their military capacity for relief operations on a
global basis.nilS For example. in 1992, Japan amended its law on international disaster relief to provide a specific role for its military forces. which have been active
in operations ever since. 126 Similarly. in 1996. the Canadian military created a permanent disaster response team to be used for foreign disaster operations.L27 The
US military, long mandated to participate in international disaster relief. has also
increased its emphasis on "humanitarian" activities in recent years. 128 For instance.
its contribution after the 2004 tsunami was its biggest operation in the Asia- Pacific
region since the Vietnam War.129 The Americans. Japanese and Canadians joined
no less than thirty-two other national militaries that responded to the tsunami. 1.30
Similarly. in 1998 NATO created its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and has also embraced a "growing humanitarian role" in
disaster response operations, including for Hurricane Katrina in the United States
and the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. L31 NATO has even gone so far as to
negotiate its own memorandum of understanding with member States for the facilitation of civilian relief personnel and materiel. U2 Proposals have recently been
raised for regional military cooperation mechanisms in Central America and Asia
to facilitate military involvement in disaster relief. L33
Second. military responders experience many of the same legal issues and concerns as civilian actors in disaster response operations, as well as issues uniquely related to the commonly strict domestic regulation of their mandates and roles in
international operations and the special sovereignty and security concerns that the
presence offoreign troops raise for affected States. L3-t As noted in one summary of
the "lessons learned" from NATO's intervention in Pakistan. "[ tlhe importance of
working with host governments must not be underestimated. Many issues must be
resolved before operations forces arrive, including terms of entry, force protection,
legal status. communication channels. liaison arrangements, contracting arrangements. use ofland for basing and translators. "135
Third. military responders face a similarly patchy normative framework. Few
existing disaster-related treaties make specific reference to military involvement,
though many of their more general provisions (for example. on facilitating entry of
goods and personnel) should also apply to military responders. Those that do have
specific reference, such as the ASEAN Agreement, 136 the BSEC Agreement, L37 and

307

The Law of International Disaster Response
the Agreement of 1974 between Sweden and Norway concerning the Improvement
of Rescue Services in Frontier Areas 138 comm only seek to address issues of the
command relationship between the assisting and affected State forces, identification of foreign forces (e.g., uniforms) and the carriage of arms. When they are in
place, bilateral or regional (e.g., NATO) status of forces agreements or MOUs address a nwnber of the issues that m ight arise for military actors in disaster operations. l39 However, they are limited in number and difficult to negotiate at the
outset of a disaster.
The pre-eminent "soft law" instrwnent on m ilitary involvement in disaster relief is the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief. First developed by the United Nations and endorsed by an international
conference in Oslo in 1994, the Oslo Guidelines were updated and "relaunched" at
a new conference in November 2006. 140 Particularly as updated this year, the
guidelines stress that military relief assets should be considered a last resort when
no civilian alternatives are available. 141 They also encourage (though do not require) military and civil defense forces to act "under UN control" in disaster operations.142 They set out minimum facilities that should be offered by affected States,
in areas such as legal status, customs, visas, overflight and security, and also set out
coordination structures and basic principles to which military and civil defense operations should adhere. They also include a m odel agreement addressing these
sorts of issues as an annex.
The emphasis in the Oslo Guidelines on civilian control reflects the current ambiguity in the humanitarian community about the increasing role of the military in
disaster operations. On the one hand, the capacities and achievements of military
actors in international disaster relief-particularly in the areas of transport and logistics-are undeniable. For instance, the international military contributions to
the tsunami relief have been described as pivotal to the success in avoiding the
feared "second tsunami" of starvation and disease. 143 On the other hand, military
assistance is expensive-sometimes many times more costly than when the same
services are provided by civilian sources l44-and its identification and integration
with humanitarian activities raises thorny policy issues. These are particularly
acute in armed conflict settings, when military attempts to " win hearts and minds"
can confuse the distinction between military and humanitarian agencies, rendering the latter more liable to attack. 14s However, even in disaster settings, an overly
dose identification has been seen as dangerous for public perceptions of the neutrality of humanitarian actors. Moreover, there is concern that precedent set for
dose integration between military and humanitarian actors in a disaster setting
may be difficult to alter in a later situation of conflict. l46 Thus, the Oslo Guidelines
call for "direct assistance" to be provided as much as possible by humanitarian
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actors, with militaries instead providing "indirect assistance" (such as transport
and logistical aid) and "infrastructure support" (such as rebuilding roads and generating power).147

Conclusion and Prosp ects for the Future
It seems plain that some improvements in the way that international disaster assis-

tance is generally facilitated and regulated would be desirable. While every disaster
setting is in some ways unique, and the very nature of the enterprise (particularly in
sudden-onset disasters) lends itself to some level of improvisation, the fac t that a
consistent set of legal problems tends to crop up in disaster settings around the
world suggests that better regulation may have a role in improving the outcome of
disaster relief operations.
At the national level, a workable balance still remains to be struck in most States
between sufficient openness to allow quick entry and easy operation of international disaster assistance and sufficient control to ensure the quality and overall effectiveness of a relief and recovery effort. International actors (both civilian and
military) and affected State governments have suffered alike from this imbalance,
to the detriment of efficient support to affected persons. To address this, more governments need to thoroughly analyze such issues and adopt appropriate legislation
and regulations prior to being struck by a disaster. Some-particularly those struck
by major disasters in 200S1 48_are beginning to do so, and others might be led to it
through their activities pursuant to the Hyogo Framework.
At the international level, the dissemination and use of existing instruments
could be much improved. 149 Even if this occurs, however, there are significant gaps
in the current framework when measured against the common problem areas.
Nevertheless, one commentator, noting the spotty historical development of international norms in this area, ongoing State concerns about sovereignty, and the recently enhanced emphasis of the international community on disaster risk
reduction has concluded that "the direct role of international law with respect to
the policy on natural disasters will not grow significantly. "ISO On the other hand, as
described above, recent years have seen significant "hard" and "soft" law developments, including the ASEAN Agreement, the International Health Regulations, the
entry into force of the Tampere Convention, the NATO MOU and the revision and
reaffirmation of the Oslo Guidelines. In fact, there seems to be no shortage of will
to address some of the relevant issues, but rather a continuing lack of coherence
and comprehensiveness among current initiatives.
Looking to the future, the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent, a forum including all State parties to the Geneva Conventions as well as
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the various components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movem ent. is scheduled to
take up a set of recommendations o n the issues described in this paper in November 2007-particularly with regard to what States might be encouraged to include
in dom estic law and policy. The consultation process leading to that conference.
including regional forums organized with governmental and inter-governmental
pa rtners around the glo be. has already begu n generating greater publicity and
attention to these issues.lSi Moreover. the International Law Commission (a UN
body whose object is the "promotion of the progressive development of international
law and its codification"152) recently decided to place the issue of the "protection of
persons in natural disasters" on its lo ng-term program of work. 153 There is thus reason
to hope that there will be greater progress on these issues in the near future.
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